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This article explores how framings of the 2014–16 outbreak of Ebola as
a crisis, its causes, nature and consequences gave rise to two seemingly
contradictory types of interventions within affected communities in Sierra
Leone: a militarized state of emergency on the one hand, and efforts to foster
local engagement and ownership on the other. Teasing out explicitly the
underlying logic of these two modes of response, we are able to discern
the convergence between containment and engagement approaches that are
at the heart of contemporary humanitarianism. Rather than being opposed
or contradictory, the article shows how they were mutually constitutive,
through negotiations between different ways of knowing and responding to
the Ebola crisis. The resulting divisive practices, juxtaposing ‘Ebola heroes’
and ‘dangerous bodies’, re-ordered the landscapes that individuals had to
navigate in order to manage uncertainty. Tracing these logics through to
the ‘subjects’ of intervention, the article tells the story of one traditional
healer’s ‘epistemic navigations’ in his efforts to survive both the epidemic
and its response. Bringing these dynamics and their consequences to the
fore in the Sierra Leonean case invites broader reflections on a humanitarian
assemblage increasingly reliant on the mutual constitution of containment
and engagement, security and resilience, in its approach to managing ‘at risk’
populations.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2014, the first official cases of Ebola were recorded in Guinea. By
August of that year, theWorld Health Organization (WHO) had announced a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) as the epidemic
reached hundreds of cases a week in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. By
the end of the epidemic inMarch 2016, over 28,000 people had been affected
by the disease: 11,310 died and countless others suffered as a result of the
significant socio-economic setbacks associated with the outbreak (WHO,
2016). The tortuous two-year battle that seemingly caught the world off
guard gave rise to innumerable analyses (e.g. Abramowitz, 2017; DuBois
et al., 2015; GHRF Commission, 2016; Kamradt-Scott, 2016; Panel of Inde-
pendent Experts, 2015; Moon et al., 2015; Ross et al., 2017). These have in
turn generated recommendations for the reform of national health systems
and global response mechanisms, pointing to failures at all levels during
the West African outbreak: from systemic underfunding of the global health
apparatus, slow resource mobilization and inadequate leadership on the part
of WHO, to disastrously ill-prepared national health systems and ineffective
engagement of affected communities. Yet the road from the first infection in
Guinea’s forest region in December 2013 to the publication of compelling
explanations of what went wrong after thousands lost their lives was not
straightforward. Retracing that road entails telling the story of how scien-
tific and humanitarian communities, as well as national and international
publics, came to understand the kind of problem emerging in West Africa,
including disputes and shifts in Ebola’s meaning and adequate avenues for
response.
This article focuses on a particular aspect of this process by looking at
the relationship between the humanitarian response apparatus and affected
communities in Sierra Leone. In particular, it aims to explore how different
ways of understanding Ebola as a crisis, its nature, causes and consequences,
collided to give rise to seemingly contradictory types of interventions within
communities: on the one hand, a militarized state of emergency, and on the
other, efforts to foster local engagement and ownership. Outlining the logic
of these two modes of response in the context of Ebola allows us to elaborate
on a dynamic that increasingly characterizes contemporary humanitarianism,
namely the convergence between a logic of containment and one of engage-
ment, between militarized interventionary imaginations and a commitment
to inclusion and the fostering of local ‘resilience’. The epistemic politics
around the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone offers a case study for how con-
tainment and engagement become entwined through negotiations amongst
different kinds of actors as emergencies unfold, and highlights the material
consequences of this entanglement.
The story of how Ebola was imagined as crisis and its implications is
the subject of a growing body of literature. Moments of crisis provide a
particularly useful standpoint from which to study knowledge production
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and the role of expertise in processes of problematization.1 The notion of
crisis, or what Caduff (2015) terms a ‘culture of danger’, is ubiquitous in
contemporary public discourse, from the threat of terrorism to the menace
of financial collapse and environmental devastation. The triumphant tones
of Fukuyama’s (1992) The End of History have given way to gloomier
perceptions of reality as persistently unstable and uncertain. Taking a step
back, as Roitman (2013) invites us to do in her book Anti-crisis, highlights
how epistemological claims such as ‘this is crisis’ engender certain types of
action whilst making others impossible. In the field of international devel-
opment and humanitarianism, for instance, Duffield (2007) has pointed to
an increasing trend towards securitization, whereby the dangers of under-
development in an interconnected world have underpinned justifications for
particular kinds of aid.
Global health is a good example of this trend as concerns with ‘biosecu-
rity’ and international contagion have similarly driven action. In this context,
scholars have explored how scientific expertise engages with uncertainty in-
cluding discursive andmaterial technologies formaking the future knowable.
Caduff’s (2015) exploration of scientific prophesy in The Pandemic Perhaps,
for example, traces the politics of influenza preparedness in the USA and
the way that certain claims about impending catastrophe become more com-
pelling than others, regardless of their predictive accuracy. The perpetual
production of scientific knowledge about influenza and narratives about a
looming pandemic, ‘at once affirm and deprive the world of confidence’ so
that ‘truth is forever deferred in a circuit of infinite testing’ (ibid.: 31). Similar
prophetic claims contributed to the escalation of fear surrounding a possible
spillover of Ebola across borders, not least when the Centre for Disease
Control (CDC) predicted that without intervention we could foresee over a
million infections by January 2015 (Meltzer et al., 2014). Delays in declar-
ing Ebola an emergency raise important questions about when such claims
become compelling: when does a crisis become a crisis? Lakoff (2017: 151)
points to the role of ‘technocratic classifications’ as techniques for making
the unknown manageable. For Lakoff, failure to respond adequately and in
a timely manner to Ebola can be seen ‘at least in part as a failure in admin-
istrative imagination’, as the outbreak was initially misclassified based on
historical precedent of epidemics that were controlled through humanitarian
medicine (ibid.: 141). The declaration of a PHEIC then was a significant
‘epistemic shift’ as it ushered in a new ‘imagery’ of crisis, in which ‘eviden-
tiary charisma’ was mobilized to argue for moral obligations, such as those
to carry out research into vaccines and therapeutics (Kelly, 2018: 135, 137).
The politics of expertise and the ways in which knowledge about crisis is
produced are significant in their own right, but they also have consequences.
1. Here I follow Foucault’s understanding of problematization as the ‘ensemble of discursive
and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false and
constitute it as an object of thought’ (cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003: xix).
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The implications of epistemic claims include the ‘different modes by which
. . . human beings are made subject’ (Foucault, 1982: 777). Amongst these
are the ‘dividing practices’ embodied in ‘modes of manipulation that com-
bine the mediation of science and the practice of exclusion’, such as the
creation of subjects through scientific classification and the ‘technologies
of the self’ through which individuals discipline themselves according to
dominant discourses (Foucault, 1988; Rabinow, 1991: 8). ‘Docile [bodies]
that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’ are thus a product
of these intersections between knowledge and power (Foucault, 1975: 136).
Anthropological explorations of international development programming
have taken these concerns seriously, analysing how the definition of prob-
lems and delineation of solutions configure social relations and subjects. Li’s
work on conservation projects in Indonesia, for example, reflects how in-
terventions that intend to ‘[optimize] the lives of others’ require identifying
‘deficiencies that need to be rectified’ (Li, 2007: 5, 7). It is by rendering these
deficiencies intelligible, through data and theories of change as well as se-
lective omissions, that it becomes possible to posit technical interventions.
Such technical solutions, through the mobilization of expert knowledge,
structure power relations not least by creating a separation between the ex-
perts who diagnose problems and the beneficiaries in need of improvement
(Ferguson, 1994). Rather than considering development as the product of
hidden agendas of powerful interests, these studies suggest that we take the
normative aims of these projects at their face value. They ask us to redirect
our focus onto what these framings produce, what identities and relations
they make possible and which they foreclose. Emancipatory visions of de-
velopment as a participatory process, for example, rely on the figure of
the ‘active citizen’ (Robins et al., 2008). Interventions create claims-based
identities, like the ‘biological citizenship’ manifest by victims of Chernobyl
in Petryna’s (2004) work. These configurations also often tell stories about
individual and collective responsibilities, such as the currently popular em-
phasis on ‘resilience’ to disasters (see Chandler, 2016). Imageries of crisis
have specifically generative effects. In a state of exception, different forms
of life come into existence through appeals to extraordinary circumstances
(Agamben, 2005). The crisis imagination creates both subjects of interven-
tion and agents of instability: ‘surplus populations’ to be contained through
projects aimed at improving, correcting or aligning these groups to normative
modes of existence (Duffield, 2007).
Drawing on this literature, this article focuses on the identities, relations
and practices conjured by particular framings of the epidemic in Sierra
Leone. The aim of the article is modest: it retells a now familiar story about
the Ebola outbreak, but drawing out explicitly the logic underpinning the
interventions and its implications in practice. Outlining negotiations around
ways to understand and tackle the drivers of continued contagion in the final
months of the epidemic, it shifts the focus away from the politics of expertise
to its ramifications for affected communities. In particular, the article points
1606 Luisa Enria
to the divisive practices that emerged from the convergence of containment
and engagement: between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens, Ebola heroes and dan-
gerous bodies. Efforts to domesticate the epidemic, rendering it knowable
and manageable, ordered new uncertain landscapes. These spaces, where
these interventionary logics are defined through individual and collective
efforts to navigate crisis, make visible the everyday realities of a contempo-
rary humanitarian project that increasingly relies on this dialectic between
containment and local ownership.
The article is based on two stints of ethnographic research, interviews and
document reviews carried out during and after the epidemic between 2015
and 2017. I was based in Kambia District, Northern Sierra Leone for 14
months of ethnographic fieldwork (starting towards the end of the epidemic)
as part of a large medical research project, where my role was to explore
community experiences of the epidemic and perceptions of interventions.
During this period I was also able to attend meetings of the National and
the District Ebola Response Centres. This was followed by a further five
months of research in Kambia and in Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown, in
2017 studying the effects of experience and memories of the Ebola response
on ideas of citizenship and state–society relations. In both periods, I carried
out interviews with individuals involved at different levels of the response
including those working in community engagement and surveillance, mil-
itary officers, community activists, health workers, traditional healers and
ordinary citizens affected by the outbreak.
The article firstly shows how, in the particular context of the Ebola re-
sponse in Sierra Leone, security approaches focusing on containment co-
existed with community engagement narratives. Rather than presenting the
discourse of the response as ‘totalizing and seamless’ (Li, 2007: 25), it de-
scribes instead the contestations between very different kinds of actors work-
ing in the hardest of circumstances and their efforts to control a constantly
changing epidemic landscape. This is not incompatible with an assessment
of how these efforts to interpret and manage crisis (re)ordered political
relations and created subjectivities through particular dividing practices. Fi-
nally, the article turns to the ‘subjects’ of intervention, considering how the
containment/engagement logic structured the space of possible action in af-
fected communities. Here the article joins an emergent literature exploring
everyday life and practices in relation to the Ebola response (Desclaux et al.,
2017; Hoffman, 2016; Lipton, 2017; Shepler, 2017) but also draws on a
broader literature on tactical agency in uncertain landscapes (de Certeau,
1984; Christiansen et al., 2006; Utas, 2005; Vigh, 2006). This is outlined
through the experiences of a traditional healer, Pa Yamba,2 who repositioned
himself from being a potentially dangerous subject in need of containment
to becoming a knowledge broker, embodying the containment/engagement
2. This is a pseudonym.
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logic in his role as a member of a burial team. Pa Yamba refashioned his
‘traditional knowledge’ to shift subjectivities from a ‘dangerous body’ to
an ‘Ebola hero’ and, in turn, to enforce (but also remould) those dividing
practiceswithin his community. This allowed him to survive not only the epi-
demic itself but also the logic of its response, pointing to a form of ‘epistemic
navigation’, a further tactic in Sierra Leoneans’ long-standing repertoire of
practices of accommodating crisis and its management in their daily lives.
OPERATION NORTHERN PUSH: WORLDS COLLIDE
In the summer of 2015 Sierra Leone was entering its second rainy season
marked by the Ebola epidemic. Kambia, a border town where the last days of
the ‘Ebola fight’ were being fought, lies on the Freetown–Conakry highway,
which at the time was strewn with checkpoints where soldiers and health
officers took travellers’ temperatures under the torrential rain. I was posted
there as part of the social science team in a medical research project that was
being set up in the district. The striking clash of temporalities, between the
urgency of the emergency and the slower process of setting up clinical re-
search, meant wewere often observers of the District Ebola Response Centre
(DERC) meetings, trying not to stand in the way of the unfolding emergency
operation. Those who had been on the frontlines for the greater part of the
epidemic were visibly tired and every new case announced was met with
audible frustration at the evening meetings in the former Resource Centre
which had become a hub for operations in the district. Occasional disagree-
ments amongst members of different pillars making up the district-level
response offered glimpses into the complex dilemmas faced by responders.
One evening, the discussion heated up around the issue of bylaws that envi-
sioned fines and jail sentences for those found in contravention of regulations
put in place to combat the outbreak, such as the recording of ‘strangers’ ar-
riving in town or the reporting of illness and death and performance of safe
burials. A group of people in the district headquarters had been caught car-
rying out a burial in secret. The group had washed the body of their loved
one — a practice central to local funerary rites but also carrying the highest
risk of infection.
Ebola spreads through direct contact with body fluids of a person who is
sick or has died of the disease, with the viral load being at its highest in
a dead body. Funerals were identified early on in the epidemic as ‘super-
spreader events’ given the region’s burial practices involving the washing
of the dead (Richards, 2016). Because of the risks associated with funerals,
as Lipton (2017: 804) notes, ‘the regulation and transformation of mortuary
practices were not collateral challenges but principal aims of the interna-
tional response’. The response was to put in place procedures for ‘Safe
and Dignified Burials’ to be carried out for any death, and not only those
confirmed to have been caused by the virus, by a burial team dressed in
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Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). These procedures and their deviation
from customary burial practices were a major source of contention because
of the social meaning of death and the central role of funerary rites to the
reproduction of social order (Lipton, 2017; Richards, 2016; Richards et al.,
2015). Despite recognition of the fundamental disruption and anguish that
these regulations were generating within families and communities, and ef-
forts to integrate aspects of customary rituals in the safe burial protocols,
the bylaws being discussed on that summer evening in Kambia had been
deemed necessary to curb the persistent problem of secret burials performed
to bypass the regulations.
The discussion centred on the fact that those caught burying their relative
in the middle of the night, hoping to go undetected, were facing the pos-
sibility of time in jail. Some in the room expressed their discomfort with
this decision, proposing that DERC consider how these bylaws could be
reconciled with the recognition of the rights of the individuals involved.
Another response worker, however, retorted: ‘People have been lying to us,
there is a background of deceit, we can’t be too forgiving’. This tension
between the protection of individual rights and the need to get community
buy-in for the response, on the one hand, and the need to respond urgently
to the risks posed to the collective by individual behaviour, on the other,
was at the heart of the challenge posed by Ebola. In Kambia, these ques-
tions came to a head that summer, as the district, together with neighbouring
Port Loko, became the centre of Operation Northern Push. The Operation
was established to intensify efforts to ‘identify, contain and eradicate EVD
[Ebola Virus Disease]’ from the last two districts where cases continued
to be reported (NERC, 2015a). This would require ‘intensive community
engagement’ (DERC, 2015) as well as a ‘significant security element’ to
support the implementation of new regulations. These included a 6 pm to 6
am curfew and strengthened checkpoints, as well as ‘strong efforts to find,
isolate and track people who abscond and an increase in community surveil-
lance, enhanced by a stricter enforcement of the Safe and Dignified Burial
bylaws’ (NERC, 2015a).
The Sierra Leone government’s decision to ‘take political risks by be-
coming more muscular’ with Operation Northern Push, as one senior offi-
cial involved in the international response recalled, reflected the growing
impatience of the final efforts to end the epidemic.3 However, the establish-
ment of a heavy-handed intervention bringing together ‘engagement’ and
‘security’ elements can also be seen as the culmination of the entangle-
ment, or even mutual constitution, of two seemingly opposed logics: one
premised on containment and the other on community participation and be-
haviour change. Illustrating the assumptions and operationalization of these
two types of logic, tracing their justifications and in particular their mutual
3. Interview, former international response representative, London, 21 December 2016.
Containment and Engagement in Humanitarian Emergencies 1609
dependence, invites broader reflections on the implications of the collision of
these twoworlds across a growing number of humanitarian and development
interventions.
STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE LOGIC OF CONTAINMENT
The road towards identifyingEbola as an emergency and then the even harder
task of bringing it to an end are products of contemporary configurations of
humanitarian practice. Chronologies of the outbreak begin with Patient Zero,
a young boy who played with a dead bat in the Guinean village ofMeliandou
in December 2013 (Leach, 2015). Despite calls, in particular by Me´decins
Sans Frontie`res, to intervene, the WHO only declared an emergency on 8
August 2014 after 1,700 cases had been recorded across the three affected
countries. In the ‘epistemic shift’ ushered in by the declaration of a PHEIC, a
number of mechanisms for intervention became possible (Kelly, 2018).4 The
epidemic was declared a ‘threat to peace and security’ by the UN Security
Council in September 2014, in keeping with the increasing securitization
of the global health agenda (Abraham, 2011; Benton and Dionne, 2015;
Bernard, 2013; Chigudu, 2016; Davies, 2008; Heymann, 2003).5
In awell-practised discursive twist, the securitization ofEbola increased its
urgency on the global agenda. This particular way of understanding Ebola as
a security problem had important consequences for how it could bemanaged.
The UN set up its first-ever peacekeeping-style health mission, UN Mission
for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). Alongside a large complex
of national and international actors from all corners of the development,
global health and humanitarian fields, the securitization of the epidemic also
ushered in a military response, through international deployments and the
leading role of local armies (Benton, 2017). Concerns with the implications
of militarization were countered by delinking military apparatuses from
military logics (ibid.):militarieswere simply seen to be better equipped, from
a logistical perspective, to deal with particularly challenging circumstances.
Militarizationwas deeply intertwinedwith the particular narrative of emer-
gency that was taking shape. The security complex is not new to Sierra
Leone. Since its 11-year civil war, the country has become emblematic
of the increasing depiction of underdevelopment as a security concern,
with structural fragilities used to explain cyclical crises (Enria, 2018).
4. Although uncertainty remained, and efforts to preserveWHO leadershipmeant, for example,
that the humanitarian apparatus, including ‘the surge capacity, emergency funding and
coordination structures typical of a large scale disaster response were not triggered’ (DuBois
et al., 2015: v).
5. Indeed, in the aftermath of Ebola, the Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework
for the Future called for an institutionalized recognition of global health as a ‘neglected
dimension of global security’ as a way to recommend an increase in spending and to combat
complacency (GHRF Commission, 2016).
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Securitization in Sierra Leone, as elsewhere, has relied on narratives of
containment of unruly, potentially dangerous populations and the spectre of
instability as the driving force for development interventions (Duffield, 2007;
Enria, 2018). As the disease spread, appeals to security were transposed to
dealing with a new crisis and containment was enacted through the ‘extraor-
dinary measures’ established in the declaration of a State of Emergency on
30 July 2014, including quarantines and restrictions on freedom of move-
ment. In some parts of the country, overwhelmed by the epidemic and in the
absence of a concerted response in the early stages, communities established
their own isolation measures and bylaws to control movement (Richards,
2016). In the fall of 2014, as the epidemic appeared to be spiralling out of
control, responsibility for coordinating the response was moved away from
the Ministry of Health into a newly established National Ebola Response
Centre (NERC) under the leadership of then Minister of Defence Paolo
Conteh. Following the successes of local initiatives, especially in southern
districts, the response was increasingly decentralized as authorities in other
districts were encouraged to implement restrictions and punitive measures
against the violation of Ebola regulations.
The logic of security, and its corollary of containment through military
intervention and ‘social distancing measures’, were not solely the product of
the ‘martial global imagination for responses to epidemics’ (Desclaux et al.,
2017: 212) or a simple mirror image of previous interventionary landscapes.
The particular configuration in the context of the Sierra Leonean response,
and especially in its final expressions such as Operation Northern Push,
also relied on specific understandings of why the epidemic had become
so intractable — ways of making sense of the uncertain terrains faced by
response workers.
‘SENSITIZATION’: THE LOGIC OF ENGAGEMENT
As the disease spread across the region, response workers pointed to chains
of transmission to highlight the factors that stood in the way of defeat-
ing Ebola. Episodes of resistance to disease control measures and prac-
tices involved in taking care of the sick and the deceased were especially
prominent explanations. These explanations focused on how a lack of un-
derstanding or unwillingness to comply with public health regulations were
hindering efforts to end Ebola. Various critics pointed to the fallacies of
these interpretations (Abramowitz et al., 2015a, 2015b; Bolten and Shepler,
2017; Chandler et al., 2015; Jones, 2011; Richards, 2016; Wilkinson and
Leach, 2015; Wilkinson et al., 2017). Indeed, ‘behavioural and culturalist’
interpretations that individualize, depoliticize and cast blame are not new
to Ebola, and have been defined as ‘as ineffective as they are unjust’ in
widely different contexts (Fassin, 2007: xix). The effectiveness, accuracy
or fairness of these narratives is, however, not the main subject of this
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article: the focus is rather on the internal logic of the behaviour change ar-
gument and how it came to play a role in the security approach to epidemic
management.
Through points of conflict and convergence, containment collided with
an approach focused on ‘sensitization’ and the engagement of communities
to create a particular, if fractured, understanding of the causes of crisis. Of
the seven challenges outlined in a Ministry of Health and Sanitation EVD
Response Plan in July 2014, four were: ‘inadequate understanding’; ‘denial,
mistrust and rejection’ arising from ‘misinterpretation of the cause of the
new disease’; ‘close community ties and movement’ that made contact trac-
ing difficult; and ‘customary burial practices’ leading to ‘panic and anxiety’
resulting from community deaths. The rest were logistical challenges asso-
ciated with the capacity of healthcare workers (including their own fears of
the disease) and geographical spread (MoHS, 2014). Alongside containment
(or ‘social distancing’) measures such as quarantines and lockdowns, then,
the Ebola response developed measures for social inclusion. An organiza-
tional pillar was set up to deal with communication and mobilization in
affected communities. The integration of ‘sensitization’ in the response can
be crudely described as a continuum of participation: starting with interven-
tions aimed at correcting misinformation on the one hand and bottom-up
approaches engaging communities in the response on the other. Over time,
the response apparatus moved much closer to the second aim. Initial efforts
at public health messaging relied on the notion that communication strate-
gies needed to change ‘risky behaviour’ related to ‘traditional practices’ and
‘misinformation’ (Chandler et al., 2015: 1275). From this point of view,
people needed more biomedical knowledge so as to protect themselves from
the disease. Billboards were put up insisting that ‘Ebola is real’ and en-
couraging people to report the sickness to a national helpline, not to wash
dead bodies, and so on. In these framings, cultural beliefs and ‘customary
practices’ either prevented a full understanding of transmission chains or ac-
tively worked against the need to adapt to the exigencies of crisis. People, as
a representative of national NGOs in the NERC argued, need to ‘understand
beyond their cultural perception’.6
As the response unfolded, the core model of behaviour change and sensiti-
zation remained intact, but the mode of delivery changed, as initial negative
messaging such as ‘Ebola kills’ was found to be counterproductive. A re-
design of the sensitization model to focus on ‘community ownership’ was
in line with intimations by anthropologists and community advocates about
the need to understand reasons for mistrust, explore the adaptive potential
of cultural practices and learn from existing community-based responses
(Laverack and Manoncourt, 2016). This had crystallized by the end of the
epidemic, as reflected in July 2015whenOperation Northern Push was put in
6. Interview, national civil society representative, Freetown, 20 January 2017.
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place, and the NERC published a new ‘Getting to a Resilient Zero’ strategy.
This located drivers of transmission in ‘fear, inadequate trust and collab-
oration from communities’ tendencies to seek healthcare through informal
structures’, and highlighted the need to ‘understand community behaviour’
and ensure that communities took leadership of the response (NERC, 2015b).
In other words, the problematization was similar, but the solution was more
sophisticated and culturally sensitive: change in practices had to come from
inside affected communities.
One of the earliest examples of this perspective was the Social Mobilisa-
tionAction Consortium’s innovative ‘Community-led Ebola Action (CLEA)
Field Manual’ developed to train community mobilizers, with the stated aim
of ‘inspiring communities to understand the urgency and the steps they can
take to protect themselves from Ebola’ (SMAC, 2014: 6). These efforts,
‘unlike previous mobilisation efforts, which have mainly used education
and one-way communications . . . focus on the community as a whole and
on the collective benefits of a cooperative and community-led approach’
(ibid.: 6–7). Part of this process was to ensure that communities commit-
ted to temporarily putting aside knowledge and ‘traditional’ practices that
were deemed to be risky. The theory of change of these interventions was
therefore aimed at shifting risky behaviours, initially framed as misconcep-
tions, later understood to require a deeper, more inclusive engagement with
communities to address barriers to necessary behavioural changes. Like the
security complex, this turn drew explicitly from the long-standing repertoire
of development and health interventions in Sierra Leone and beyond, with
its focus on participation and behaviour change, on resilience and individual
responsibility (see, e.g., Klein, 2016).
However, during Ebola, the entanglement of security and development
agendas came to the fore in ways that are rarely so visible. As is often
the case, moments of crisis amplify and make evident underlying regimes of
knowledge. In the logic of epidemic management, the engagement paradigm
was not opposed to the logic of containment. The security approach relied on
the same interpretation of the problem.AnOffice ofNational Security (ONS)
official described the response as requiring a ‘carrot and stick’ approach: re-
strictions and punitive measures (‘stick’) had to complement community
engagement (‘carrot’).7 Security personnel’s justifications for containment
measures similarly followed the premise of the engagement model, as secu-
rity measures were reserved for those who failed to collaborate and change
their behaviours. Speaking of his involvement in the response in Kambia, an
officer of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) emphasized
his understanding of reasons that may drive affected individuals to defy
quarantines, such as the need to tend to one’s farm. At the same time, he
argued that unwillingness to commit to behaviour change, regardless of the
7. Interview, ONS representative, Freetown, 12 January 2017.
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costs, and failure to comply with emergency regulations were threats that
needed to be addressed:
In some chiefdoms that I don’t want to name, it was the lawlessness that made the sickness
spread . . . . Why do you think they [invoked] this state of emergency? If they had just
relaxed, the thing would have been worse, so they saw that the best thing they could do was
to bring in security. It was not violence per se, but just for people to comply with the law and
for them to be able to listen to the medical advice.8
The sentiment was shared beyond military circles, including a civil society
leader who argued:
When the president announced the involvement of the military I thought: ‘These people
with guns, how could they fight Ebola? Something that they cannot see?’. But when after
some time they came and I saw the rationale, because when we were also going into the
communities some people when you would give them simple instructions to follow so as not
to cause problems in the community they would not want to follow it. If we had not had the
law enforcers like the military it would have been difficult!9
Security and engagement, in other words, were two sides of the same coin,
although this is not to say that there were not fundamental tensions between
sets of actors engaged in quite different sides of the response. This was
clear, for example, in the altercations at the DERC surrounding the fate of
those caught performing unsafe burials. As in every large-scale interven-
tion, and certainly in one as complex as that mounted to counter Ebola,
the motivations, ethos and practices across different actors were extremely
varied. Despite these tensions, the uncomfortable but mutually constitutive
co-existence between these different sides of the responsemeant that specific
crisis subjectivities emerged in often-unintended ways.
DANGEROUS BODIES AND EBOLA HEROES: CRISIS SUBJECTIVITIES
In August 2015, the Kambia DERC was preparing to celebrate its achieve-
ment of 42 days without an Ebola case, and thus to declare the district free
of the virus. In a dark twist of fate, the evening meeting of the DERC opened
instead with the announcement of a new case: a woman had died in a vil-
lage within the district and a swab had confirmed her positive. The military
officers in charge of the briefing told a sombre room that the district had
been ‘invaded’ and ‘attacked’ once more. Despite resolute pleas by public
health officials not to speculate about the circumstances of the case until
they had been confirmed, the meeting centred on rumours that the victim
had been infected through a secret affair with an Ebola survivor. In the
midst of uncertainty surrounding the possibility for sexual transmission by
survivors, visual representations of epidemiological chains depicted dotted
8. Interview, RSLAF representative, Kambia, 18 November 2015.
9. Interview, local civil society representative, Kambia, 29 June 2016.
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lines, expressing tentative but intimated connections between cases, telling
individual stories of traditional medicine, unsafe burials and unprotected
sex.
Efforts to render the epidemic manageable relied on particular problema-
tizations of the crisis, operationalized through pre-existing interventionary
paradigms. Security and engagement were brought together into a single
solution necessitated by the urgency and uncertainty of the emergency as it
unfolded. Change had to happen within communities, driven by individuals
willing to commit to changing their practices and convincing their commu-
nities to do the same. Containment measures would enforce compliance and
deal with deviance. The political dimensions of crisis were muted as respon-
sibility was individualized and containment measures depicted as inevitable.
Yet, these problematizations were deeply political in practice, not least in
the way that they produced a dichotomy of subjects: the ‘Ebola heroes’, the
active citizens that accepted biomedical expertise and took charge of sensiti-
zation drives; and those who were holding up progress, the dangerous bodies
putting their society at risk. These subjectivities emanated from both the ‘ma-
terial and immaterial’ dimensions of disease control strategies, through the
language, spatial practices and visual artefacts of the response such as repre-
sentations of epidemiological chains at response meetings (Hoffman, 2016:
247).
In their ‘Standard Operating Procedure for Social Mobilisation and Com-
munity Engagement’, the NERC (2015c: 1) tells prospective mobilizers that:
‘To stop Ebola transmission, communities and individuals themselves must
make changes to some of their social and cultural practices. Social mobilisa-
tion and community engagement aims to help communities and individuals
to understand and take ownership of their situation’. In the CLEA Field
Manual such ownership of behaviour change was to be led by ‘community
champions’, who were ‘critical to success, because they have the com-
mitment and energy to follow up with their neighbours and to encourage
changes in community norms and implementation of the agreed action plan’
(SMAC, 2014: 29). Community champions were to carry their communities
to what the CLEA manual calls an ‘ignition moment’, that is, the ‘collective
realisation that due to community practices (of good, caring people) com-
munity members are currently at serious risk of catching Ebola’ (ibid.: 26).
The notion that communities, led by active and concerned individuals, are
central to the response was further underlined by the ubiquitous billboards
asserting that ‘You can help to Stop Ebola’ and posters pasted across the
country picturing doctors, contact tracers, survivors and police officers as
‘Ebola Heroes’.
These narratives of community ownership and individual responsibility
for the common good were undoubtedly reductive. ‘Ebola heroes’ such as
nurses and volunteers faced challenges regarding remuneration and hazard
pay, as well as suffering significant stigma and mental health repercus-
sions (Kingori and McGowan, 2016). Similarly, community engagement
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language romanticized communities, evading the realities of power and
hierarchies and the impact these would have on the implementation of en-
gagement practices (Enria et al., 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2017). However,
as has been recognized by scholars of development discourse, it is often
precisely through such simplifications that it is possible to create powerful
mobilizing narratives (Mosse, 2004). As such, politics and the challenges
of mistrust and community tensions had to be put aside in order to elicit
action.
The figure of the Ebola hero was premised on its opposite: the dangerous
bodies of the sick, the dead and, most importantly, those at risk of con-
tracting and transmitting the disease. These distinctions came into being
through ‘dividing practices’ such as body bags, PPE outfits, quarantines
and triage points. In their study of different containment and contact-tracing
measures in Guinea and Senegal, Desclaux et al. (2017: 229), drawing on
Mary Douglas’s seminal work on purity and danger, point to the role of
containment as an ‘ideal order based on the visible distinction between
the risky and the safe, a cultural process fundamental for the symbolic
control of disorder’. Their cross-country comparisons show that although
quarantines were negotiated differently, resulting in different models across
contexts, containment practices could result in stigma as communities as-
sumed that individuals involved had been contaminated. Amongst those in
Kambia, a border town, who had experienced quarantine and other mea-
sures especially under Operation Northern Push, the challenge of the state
of emergency was often recounted through comparison with neighbouring
Guinea where procedures did not involve being ‘locked’ in, or held in a
‘civilized prison’ as a respondent described it during a parallel Operation in
Freetown.10
The language used to describe the response also contributed to the produc-
tion of dividing practices, such as the war imagery and combat metaphors
described above. The ‘invisible enemy’ was to be defeated by finding and
containing people who were a risk to themselves and others. In September
2015, for example, a reward was announced for finding a missing contact
related to the last transmission chain in Kambia. Response officials empha-
sized that her dangerous behaviour might be due to a lack of knowledge and
understanding and so, whilst not intending to treat her like a criminal, she
needed to be found:
The National Ebola Response Centre (NERC) has announced a five million Leones reward
for the arrest or information leading to the whereabouts of . . . believed to be an Ebola
high-risk contact. [She], who is ‘not a criminal’, according to the CEO, Palo Conteh, has
been out of the radar of Contact Tracers for the past 20 days . . . . ‘It is also possible that
she does not understand how vital she is to the response’, the CEO maintains. (Awoko,
2015)
10. Interview, community member, Freetown, 11 September 2017.
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Problematizations of the crisis and the practical solutions theymade possible
thus relied on the production of subjectivities to be acted upon and the
distinction between active citizens to be included and recalcitrant ones to be
distanced. Willingness or ability to embrace the knowledge of the response,
and adapting one’s beliefs and practices accordingly, marked the boundaries
between the two.
PA YAMBA: EPISTEMIC NAVIGATIONS
Regulations over local practices were a central arena for these contrasts be-
tween different forms of knowledge. For example, the practice of traditional
medicine was banned under the state of emergency as the application of
herbal remedies on patients’ bodies was deemed to be a major conduit of
disease. Moreover, consultation with herbalists rather than visiting health
centres meant that potential cases of the disease were going undetected.
Many healers felt aggrieved as they were put out of work; some continued
in secret, risking fines and their lives as many were exposed to the virus.
In Kambia, a fine of 500,000 Leones was imposed and several prominent
healers in the district were quarantined after having come into contact with
suspected Ebola patients. With the growing role of community engagement
in the response, traditional healers were invited to join mobilization drives.
Such integration was, however, accompanied with suspicion in Kambia, em-
blematic of long-standing ambivalent attitudes towards herbalists and their
role in healthcare provision in the district.
Amongst those who had lobbied before the crisis for the inclusion of
traditional medicine in the health systemwas PaYamba, a powerful herbalist
from an area of the district renowned for producing formidable healers.
His advanced age and wisdom made him the keeper of the trade’s history,
with prospective apprentices always welcome in his crowded house. As we
sat on his veranda towards the end of the outbreak, Pa Yamba reflected
on his own decision to take an active role in the response. In the early
months of the state of emergency he volunteered for a job nobody wanted
to do: he joined the burial team, tasked with burying the dead according to
Infection Prevention and Control protocols as well as following the ‘safe and
dignified burials’ guidelines. Burials, as noted above,were at the centre of the
response and like traditional healing, they brought to the fore ‘the core social
conflict of the Ebola crisis: local beliefs and practices versus those of the
international response’ (Lipton, 2017: 804). The new regulations prohibiting
the washing and dressing of dead bodies and the use of body bags by PPE-
clad burial teams caused significant tensions between the Ebola response
agents and the communities where they intervened. Burial team members
came to inhabit a challenging in-between space, as representatives of the
response measures contributing to social disruption, but also taking the lead
in efforts to humanize these measures and negotiating funerary protocols
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within communities (Lipton, 2017). Of course, the burial teams’ task was
also extremely risky and Pa Yamba remembered that when the job was
advertised many refused. However, he argued that this was the only way he
was able to continue feeding his family as he had stopped practising. In our
conversations he emphasized his refusal to accept patients throughout the
outbreak, theatrically demonstrating how he would turn people away and
report them to the police in secret.
Two incidents he recounted stood out as symbolic of the ways in which
people like Pa Yamba sought to navigate the crisis, mediating the local
knowledge and the knowledge produced by the response in an effort to
manage uncertainty. In Pa Yamba’s narrative, it was this kind of epistemic
navigation that allowed him to survive both the epidemic and the difficult
terrains created by the response and its regulations. The first story began with
Pa Yamba and his team being called out to a village in a different chiefdom.
As they arrived in their response vehicle and approached the house, they
met several women boiling pots of water, preparing to wash the body of
the deceased. Pa Yamba gestured to his team to proceed slowly. Making no
mention of the water being prepared, he asked one of the women to show
him to the room where the deceased lay. He asked one of his colleagues to
discreetly jot down the names of the caregivers as the woman enumerated
them, to be used later for tracing any at-risk contacts. As he left the room
and stepped into a backyard he met a huddle of men who, believing he did
not speak their local language, made arrangements to attack him and his
team. Pa Yamba remained calm and signalled to his colleagues that it was
time to leave. As the men produced their machetes, the burial team jumped
in the car and departed at great speed. On their way out, military officers on
their motorbikes stopped the car, asking the team why they were driving so
fast. After they recounted their story, the soldiers told them to turn around:
they would escort them. When they arrived, Pa Yamba described how the
soldiers forced the village men onto their knees, hitting them with the butts
of their guns, whilst the burial team quickly changed into their PPE and
buried the body. Before leaving, Pa Yamba made the villagers hold out the
kasanke, the Muslim burial cloth, while he set it on fire — half procedure,
half punishment.
The point of this story is not to report malpractice amongst Ebola response
workers or to sensationalize the violence that was part of both disease con-
tainment and resistance to it. Rather, it is to highlight how someone like Pa
Yamba, in telling this story, aimed to reposition himself from the danger
he embodied as a representative of traditional knowledge to active citizen,
enforcer of the response. As traditional practices were declared barriers to
disease containment, he identified a threat to his livelihood alongside the
risk that the virus posed to his life. His identity as traditional healer framed
him as a potentially dangerous citizen to be disciplined. Through his role in
the response, Pa Yamba was able to present himself as malleable and ready
to change his behaviour, in contrast to the dangerous bodies in the village.
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In his characterization of the villagers as resistant to change and potentially
violent, Pa Yamba justified their disciplining by the soldiers and the pow-
erfully symbolic burning of the kasanke as a final lesson in the importance
of collaboration. This tactical shape shifting, however, also entailed a rein-
terpretation of the role of traditional knowledge in the response in ways that
elevated him to the role of irreplaceable cultural broker. Indeed, he argued
that he was a uniquely positioned member of the burial team — not despite
his role as healer and ‘society man’ (a member of a secret society), but
because of it. He recalled, for example, a second anecdote, where Temne
members of the burial team had been sent to deal with the burial of a member
of the Limba Gbangbani society.11
Amidst widespread anxieties about new burial regulations, society burials
presented particular challenges as they are ‘secret events — not “secret
burials” in the sense implied byEbola responders, but closed events restricted
only tomembers of the sodality’ (Richards, 2016: 101). PaYamba noted that,
since the team members that were sent over were ‘outsiders’ (not initiated
‘society men’ and from a different ethnic group), they were bound to fail in
gaining the trust of those tasked with the funeral. As his prediction proved
accurate, Pa Yamba was called in and was able to negotiate, convincing the
Gbangbani to ‘play the society’ in the forest as the burial team buried the
man according to the procedures. He described how the burial teammembers
became afraid during the funeral as they heard the society’s performance in
the distance, but he assured them his efforts had pacified them. As a society
man, Pa Yamba was able to be at once enforcer of dividing practices and a
broker for reframing the response according to his superior knowledge of the
community. Whilst accepting the premises of the emergency measures, he
moulded the response in ways that made him and people like him essential
to success, whilst simultaneously differentiating himself from dangerous
others by disciplining them.
During the outbreak there was a spectrum of resistance to the knowledge
and practices of the response, from refusal to comply with regulations to
social commentary, rumours and conspiracies or the violent resistance plot-
ted by the villagers in Pa Yamba’s story. Yet juxtaposing engagement to
overt resistance or rejection of dominant ways of knowing is a reductive
representation of agentive possibilities. Pa Yamba moved tactically, rene-
gotiating his role in the crisis. In his individual effort to manage uncertain
terrain, Pa Yamba re-enacted and reproduced the logic of the response.
His repositioning of traditional knowledge through the idioms of the re-
sponse, of containment and engagement, reflects a particularly creative way
11. A male initiation society found primarily amongst members of the Limba ethnic group
in Sierra Leone. As Goguen and Bolten (2017: 435) argue, the Gbangbani is particularly
respected and feared in Sierra Leone, and because of its role in fighting witchcraft it is
central to perceptions of safety within communities so that, for example, ‘the importance to
the body politic of handling the death of [an] initiator properly cannot be overstated’.
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to manage uncertainty. This kind of epistemic navigation, in other words,
echoes the fluid nature of identity and social order inscribed in the re-
gion’s history, as individual efforts to survive insecurity have long required
rapid responses to shifting terrains (Enria, n.d.; Lipton, 2017; McGovern,
2012).
CONCLUSION
The story of the West African Ebola outbreak will shape how future epi-
demics will be contained, how national health systems are rebuilt and how
both governments and citizens in the three most affected countries rebuild
their societies and their lives. In this article, I have aimed to retell the familiar
story of the epidemic, by focusing on the epistemic struggles between dif-
ferent kinds of actors through their efforts to make the crisis ‘knowable’ and
therefore manageable. In retelling this story, the article aims to render visi-
ble its underpinning assumptions and logic as well as their implications. A
conjuncture of narratives about crisis and its roots, driven by different fram-
ings, from epidemiological considerations to the politics of international
intervention and national-level negotiations, configured a particular set of
relations and subjectivities during a state of exception. The coming together
of state of emergency regulations on the one hand, and a growing concern
for community engagement and behaviour change on the other, created a
dichotomy between compliant and dangerous citizens in need of discipline
and containment. At a time of great uncertainty, in other words, different
framings collided to create a depoliticized plan for action with deeply po-
litical consequences. Appeals to security facilitated militarized containment
practices and expedient complements to community engagement efforts,
and thus dividing narratives about individual responsibility and the public
goods. This in turn shaped the possibilities for individuals to navigate their
own way out of the emergency. Some resisted, whilst others like Pa Yamba
appropriated and reshaped the idiom of the response, thus reproducing its
logic through his efforts to survive. Whilst subjects are made through inter-
ventions they also actively reproduce and mould them through individual
efforts to navigate uncertainty.
Drawing out the logic of crisis narratives and the response they made pos-
sible, brings to the fore a particular feature of contemporary humanitarian
interventions, that is the co-existence of two types of approaches that appear
opposed and are instead co-extensive: containment and engagement. Critical
approaches to humanitarian and development interventions that paint them
as efforts to contain ‘surplus populations’, in this view, are not contrasted
by participatory visions. Rather, they rely on each other: securitization and
resilience as the two faces of the same interventionary imagination. We
see this as military actors increasingly become first responders in human-
itarian crises, or as redirection of aid policies towards a focus on security
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goes alongside localization agendas. Ebola offered an especially visual rep-
resentation of the containment/engagement logic through its quarantines
and social mobilization drives — the symbiosis between social distancing
and closeness. Yet these have been powerful mobilizing metaphors across
crises, from migration to unemployment. As the humanitarian gaze has
shifted onto the next emergency, including a current Ebola epidemic in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, it remains important to trace the every-
day implications of the modalities of contemporary approaches to managing
uncertainty.
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